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B. STATUTORY ARM'S-LENGTH PROFITS OF DUTCH FINANCE COMPANIES
The Dutch Ministry of Finance has recently published new guidelines for the
issuance of advance rulings concerning the Dutch tax treatment of finance com-
panies (which are typically special-purpose affiliates of multinational enterprises
designed to borrow and re-lend capital within the group). 20 Assuming the finance
company bears no credit or currency risk, advance rulings will be issued for
companies earning between 1/8th and 1/16th of 1 percent of the capital supplied
by related parties and between 1/4th and 1/32nd of 1 percent of the capital
supplied by third parties. In each case these percentages will decrease inversely
to the amount of the finance company's capital.
France*
The enactment of Law 89-5311 significantly changes the securities market in
France. The purpose of this enactment is twofold. First, it renders the financial
market safer by strengthening the powers of the Stock Exchange Commission
(COB). 2 Second, it introduces a greater "transparency" into the market, prin-
cipally with regard to public offers to purchase and to exchange. Further, the law
strikes a balance of interests among different kinds of shareholders.
The new enactment still must be complemented by two regulations to be
issued by the Securities Market Council (CBV) 3 and by the COB. These two
regulations will specify rules to be followed in public offers to purchase (OPA) 4
and in voting agreements. Except for the rules relating to self-government, Law
89-531 is of immediate application, and will become effective on July 1, 1991.
For certain measures concerning the COB only, Law 89-531 will become op-
erative when that body is restructured in compliance with the new enactment.5
20. Ministry of Finance Letter dated June 8, 1989, noted in I TAX NOTES INT'L 520-21 (Nov. 1989).
By Barth~lmy Mercadal, Conservatoire National des Arts et Mrtiers, Paris, France. Translated
by Henry Dahl, Boudreau & Dahl, Dallas, Texas.
I. Enacted on August 2, 1989 and published two days later in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANcAISE [J.0.] Law 89-531 (Fr.), 28 RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY-LEGISLATION [D.S.L.]
Law 89-531 (Fr.).
2. The Stock Exchange Commission is the French equivalent to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in the United States. The original name is Commission des Operations de Bourse
and it is known by its initials as COB.
3. The initials are taken from the original French name, Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs.
4. The initials are taken from the original French name, Offre Publique d'Achat.
5. This date will be announced in a ministerial decree (arr&t ministeriel), to be published in
the JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANOAISE.
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I. Activities of the COB
The statute not only restructures the COB and specifies the way of appointing
board members, it also decisively strengthens the powers of this body. The COB
can now impose fines of up to ten million francs on those who infringe COB
regulations. In cases where profits have been made, the penalty can reach as high
as ten times the amount of the profit. Fines of this kind, proportionate to the
degree of infringement and to the profits made, can only be imposed after due
process, which involves a hearing, consideration of pleadings, and the like. 6 The
COB can also order the publication of its decision in any magazine or newspaper,
at the cost of the violating party.
In the course of investigating complaints of insider trading, malicious release
of inaccurate information, or manipulation of exchange rates, COB inspectors
may-paralleling the powers of tax, customs, and free trade authorities-search
any premises, even private, and impound any documents. This kind of procedure
requires the previous authorization of the Tribunal de Grande Instance7 and the
presence of an officer of the Judicial Police.
At the COB's request, the president of the Tribunal de Grande Instance may:
(a) order the impounding of funds, commercial papers, or rights belonging to
parties under investigation, whether third parties are holding such assets or not;
(b) issue a temporary injunction preventing any physical or legal person from
participating in the securities market; and (c) in case of urgency, request a bond,
discretionally established by the court, from any party under investigation. All
of these sanctions are subject to criminal liability in case of infringement. The
COB also may request corporations that solicit public funds to supply comple-
mentary reports or other kinds of verification.
Appeals against COB decisions-other than those that are merely regulatory
or related to collective investments in securities-now lie with the judiciary and
not with the administrative courts. In general, appeals of this kind do not prevent
enforcement. The president of the Paris Court of Appeal may, however, stay an
execution that is "likely to provoke consequences largely disproportionate to the
nature of the case."
II. Acquisition of Shares
A. NOTICE OF OWNERSHIP OF SHARES
Any physical or juridical person who attains ownership of over 5 percent, 10
percent, 20 percent, 331/3 percent, or 50 percent of the outstanding shares of a
corporation must notify that corporation within fifteen days of having surpassed
any of these thresholds, and must inform the corporation of the exact number of
6. Known in French under the generic name of procddure contradictoire.
7. A court of original jurisdiction.
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shares under control. In the case of a corporation listed on the stock exchange,
the acquiring party must also notify the Soci6td des Bourses Frangaises 8 within
five working days after the threshold is exceeded.
In harmony with the European Directive of December 12, 1988, Law 89-531
includes several measures to improve the "transparency" of the stock market.
The obligation to give notice does not apply to stock that is not publicly listed.
A new threshold, in the amount of 662/3 percent (two-thirds) of the outstanding
shares, is added to the five thresholds mentioned above. This latest threshold
conforms to European Economic Community (EEC) law and corresponds to the
disappearance of any institutional "minority opposition ' ' 9 within the corpora-
tion.
The corporation must also, in its annual report, notify shareholders when the
new threshold is exceeded. In particular, the report must state: (a) the identity of
those holding a significant proportion of stock; and (b) the number of shares
belonging to other corporations bought by the corporation.
Two amendments have been made to the method for determining stock thresh-
olds:
(1) Scope of voting rights. When the number of votes does not correspond with
the number of shares (e.g., in case of shares with multiple votes, or shares with
no voting rights), the shares are not calculated by their number but by the number
of votes they allow. To allow shareholders to determine whether a given thresh-
old has been exceeded, the corporation must inform shareholders within fifteen
days following the annual meeting of the total number of votes then available. If,
before the next annual meeting, this number changes beyond a certain proportion
(to be established in the implementing regulation), the corporation must
promptly inform its shareholders. If the stocks are publicly listed, the corporation
must also notify the CBV. The articles or bylaws can add other thresholds to
those created by the law.
(2) Determination of the shareholder. To decide whether a given threshold has
been exceeded, one must consider not only the total number of votes held by one
person, either physical or juridical, but also: (a) the voting shares held in that
person's name; (b) the voting shares held by corporations controlled by that
person; (c) the voting shares held by someone having an informal or private
voting agreement with that person, and (d) the voting shares that the person is
entitled to buy as a matter of law, as in the case of preemptive rights or options
to purchase.
The new law also focuses on informal or private voting agreements,10 that is
to say, concealed maneuvers to acquire control or stronger voting positions.
Innovations in this area include the following:
8. A government office, similar to the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission, that controls the
public offerings of securities.
9. In French, minoritg de blockage.
10. In French, action de concert.
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(a) an informal agreement is implied whenever "two or more parties have
transacted to acquire or to convey voting rights in order to implement a common
corporate policy";'
(b) an informal agreement is deemed present in transactions among the fol-
lowing parties:
* a corporation and its directors or officers;
* corporations controlled by the same person or persons (horizontal control);
and
* a corporation and other organizations controlled by it (vertical control); and
(c) informal voting agreements are considered, not only to verify whether a
given threshold has been surpassed, but also to determine who has the duty to
inform and to refine proceedings for OPA or for a public offer to exchange
(OPE). 1
2
The notice required for any case in which a threshold is exceeded must state
not only the total number of shares that the party in question owns, but also the
total number of votes available to him. Delays in complying with the notice
requirement are penalized by withholding voting rights over the shares that
exceed a given threshold. Depending on the seriousness of the case, the suspen-
sion of voting rights can be imposed from three months to two years. At the
request of the corporation, a shareholder, or the COB, the Commercial Court
may impose a more severe penalty. For instance, the noncomplying party can be
deprived of all voting rights (not just those attached to the exceeding shares) for
a maximum of five years.
In principle, these rules are effective immediately. Nevertheless, the determi-
nation of whether any threshold has been exceeded can only be made by share-
holders after the corporation informs them of the total number of voting shares.
This determination will probably take place at the annual meeting. Until then
thresholds will be assessed as before, except that some amendments will be
immediately applicable: the new threshold of two-thirds, the rules on informal
voting agreements, and the new content requirements for notices to the corpo-
ration.
B. CORPORATE SELF-GOVERNMENT
Self-government is a device through which a corporation assures independent
control of itself by the intermediary of several other corporations, controlled by
the first one. To curb the power of self-government, and particularly to prevent
blocking mechanisms in favor of the board that are to the detriment of the
shareholders, the voting rights attached to self-government shares are now lim-
ited to 10 percent of the voting shares present at the shareholders' meeting.
11. The quoted language is originally provided by a July 24, 1966, law, J.O. Law 356- 1-3,
1.
12. See infra section II.
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As of July 1, 1991, self-government shares will have no voting rights. Only
the voting power will be lost, however. No obligations follow to dismantle
corporate self-government structures or to sell the shares in question.
C. DISCLOSURE OF SHAREHOLDERS' DEALS
The CBV must be notified of any agreement entered into by shareholders of a
publicly listed corporation that concerns preferential conditions of transfer or
purchase of shares. The CBV will enter a public record of such transaction. The
noncompliance of this duty to disclose does not, in the absence of a specific rule,
make the transaction voidable.' 3As the law presently stands, failure to disclose
only gives rise to damages in favor of those injured by the lack of disclosure. In
our opinion, the duty to disclose applies not only to new transactions, but also to
previous ones for which enforcement is presently being sought.
III. Public Offers to Purchase
The new law ensures that the CBV and the COB take important steps to
achieve the "transparency" of market transactions during an OPA and assure
that minority shareholders are respected. The exact nature of steps to be taken
will not be known until the implementing regulations for the CBV and the COB,
presently under consideration, become public. Nevertheless, following the par-
liamentary debates on the new law, the Ministry of Economy and Finance has
released certain information about the projected changes. According to this
source, the minimum capital fraction of the targeted company (presently 10
percent of the capital or 10 million French francs) over which the OPA is required
will be replaced by two-thirds of the voting shares. Furthermore, any party
holding one-third of the capital or voting shares of a publicly listed corporation
will be required to comply with OPA and OPE regulations. 14
A fight of withdrawal will be instituted in the following cases: (1) when the
majority shareholders reach a particular degree of control (probably 95 percent)
of voting fights in an annual meeting, and (2) when the corporation is trans-
formed into another type of business organization. Just as in the case of giving
notice when certain thresholds are exceeded, the rules of public offerings are
applicable not only to the immediate party making them, but also to those who
operate jointly with that party.
A. INCREASE OF CAPITAL DURING A PUBLIC OFFER
It has become standard practice, especially for publicly listed corporations, for
the shareholders' meeting to authorize the board to increase the capital one or
13. Concerning this issue, the Senate's proposal to void nondisclosed transactions, Deb. Senat
9 June 1989, J.O. at 1306, has been set aside by the Assembld Nationale, Deb. AN 23 June 1989,
J.O. at 2398.
14. The CBV, however, can waive OPA and OPE requirements in certain cases such as majority
control in a corporation by a holding company, reissue of stock, and lack of important purchases right
before the threshold was exceeded, etc.
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more times within a maximum period, which varies according to whether pre-
emptive rights have been suppressed or not. Once a corporation has been made
the target of an OPA or an OPE, the authorization mentioned in the preceding
paragraph can be used as a means of defense, because the concentration of
capital renders the operation more expensive and less certain for the offeror. In
practice, however, such a maneuver can rarely be used because of COB reluc-
tance to allow impediments to the free use of OPAs and OPEs.
Currently, the rule is that authorizations for the board to increase capital are
suspended during an OPA or an OPE period. There is an express exception,
however: an increase of capital is allowed if it is authorized by the shareholders'
meeting during an OPA or an OPE, and such authorization, valid only for one
year, has been given before the public offer. Furthermore, the issuance of shares
must not be restricted to one or several parties, but must be open to all share-
holders and to the general public.
The Business Associations Law, section 180, paragraph 3, authorizes the
shareholders' meeting to delegate to the board the power to decree an increase of
capital. This rule has been complemented by another rule that specifies: "In case
of an OPE such delegation is given in derogation of section 193." 15 The sense
of this amendment, adopted with practically no discussion, is not immediately
clear. It would seem that the legislature had in mind (as practitioners lobbied for)
a simplification of OPE procedures not for the targeted company but for the
offering corporation.
Presently, in the case of an OPE, two cumulative procedures must be followed:
stock exchange regulations and the law concerning contributions in kind. The
result is a procedure of such complexity and excessive duration that it constitutes
a daunting obstacle to control bids by foreign corporations, especially Anglo-
Saxon ones. But the present wording of section 180, paragraph 3, does not allow
the desired simplification since the authorization it institutes relates to the tar-
geted corporation, not to the one who initiated the offer.
B. NOTICE TO THE BOARD
Under previous legislation, notices to the board about the modification of the
economic or juridical structure proved to be insufficient in cases of OPAs and
OPEs. According to the new law, the president of the corporation must inform
the board as soon as an OPA or an OPE has been initiated. The board may, with
the president's consent, invite the offerors to explain the terms of such offer to
the corporation.
When the OPA or the OPE targets the controlling corporation of a group,
notice must be given to that group's committee, which may invite the authors of
15. Section 193 concerns contributions in kind.
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the offer to explain the project in detail. The board or the group committee only
has the right to receive notice. No right to intervene and to try to block the offer
follows.
C. RIGHT TO CALL A SHAREHOLDERS' MEETING
After an OPA or an OPE, or the transfer of a controlling block of shares, the
majority shareholders of capital or voting rights may call a shareholders' meet-
ing. The purpose of this rule is to allow any new majority to fire unwanted
corporate officials who cling to their posts by refusing to call a meeting that could
unseat them.
IV. Other Rules
A. INVESTMENT SOCIETY OF VARIABLE CAPITAL (SICAV) AND COMMON
INVESTMENT FUND (FCP)-THEIR CAPITALIZATION 16
Since October 1, 1989, SICAVs and FCPs are not forced to distribute their
revenue from fixed investments on an annual basis. This important amendment
will allow the establishment in France of capitalized SICAVs and FCPs like those
that exist already in numerous countries. This new concept allows parties to be
taxed only when they choose to sell their stock and only for the profit made at
that moment. Tax is exempted if the total profit made in one year does not exceed
a limit established annually (F 288,400 in 1988). Anything beyond this level is
subject to a 16 percent tax.
B. COMMUNICATION OF PRIVILEGED INFORMATION
According to insider trading rules, those who use privileged information, or
who allow others to use it, in the stock exchange before it becomes public
knowledge, expose themselves to penal sanctions. Law 89-531 creates a new
type of liability for "all those who, due to professional reasons, hold privileged
information concerning possibilities of investment in the stock exchange and
communicate such information to third parties outside their normal scope of
work." In this way, the duty of secrecy concerning third parties is added to the
duty of refraining from using privileged information oneself.
C. DECRIMINALIZATION OF CERTAIN INFRACTIONS
Criminal sanctions against those who promote the subscription of shares is-
sued by parties not allowed to sell to the public have been abolished. Also
16. The respective names in French are: Socitt d'investissement d capital variable, and Fond
commun de placement.
FALL 1990
